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John Wheatley was born in Erith, Kent on October 22, 1772 into a well respected and wealthy 
family. His father, William, and his elder brother of the same name advanced to high military 
ranks in Kent and in the Peninsular Campaign under Wellington, respectively. A younger 
brother, Sir Henry, held positions at the courts of William IV and Queen Victoria. The family 
retained the title of the Lords of Manor Erith until 1875. 
At the age of eighteen Wheatley commenced his studies at Oxford (Christ Church College), 
received his B.A. in 1793 and was admitted to the bar four years later. In 1799 he married into 
a prominent commercial and political family in London. His wife Georgina Lushington was 
the daughter of a member of parliament and the nice of a former president of the East India 
Company. A second cousin of hers was a member of parliament as well and served as the 
presiding  officer  of  the  House  of  Commons  at  the  time  of  the  Bullion  Report  (1811). 
Wheatley  was  closely  connected  with  another  prominent  family,  namely,  that  of  Lord 
Grenville with whose nephew he studied at Oxford.  
Despite  the  best  upbringing,  education  and  opportunity,  financial  difficulties,  a  rather 
unsteady career path and frequent court disputes plagued Wheatley’s life. After a few years as 
a lawyer, he seemed to have been involved in West India trade via his wife’s family. After his 
emigration to India in 1822 he served there as “sworn clerk” at the Supreme Court. After 1827 
he spent most of his time in South Africa. He died on August 13, 1830 during his passage 
back to England.  
:KHDWOH\¶V&RQWULEXWLRQWR0RQHWDU\'RFWULQH
Between  1803  and  1828  Wheatley  published  nine  books  and  pamphlets  on  monetary 
economics  and  commerce.  His  major  legacy  is  $Q (VVD\ RQ WKH 7KHRU\ RI 0RQH\ DQG
3ULQFLSOHV RI &RPPHUFH Vol. 1 (1807) which is – to a large extent – a much refined and 
enlarged edition of his first book  5HPDUNV RQ &XUUHQF\ DQG &RPPHUFH (1803). The clear 
structure of the book and of the arguments it entails, made it a major contribution to the 
economic literature of the time. The development of his theoretical positions and the resulting 
policy recommendations can be inferred from his later publications on monetary economics -   3 
/HWWHUWR/RUG*UHQYLOOHRQWKH'LVWUHVVRIWKH&RXQWU\ (1816) and 5HSRUWRQWKH5HSRUWVRI
WKH%DQN&RPPLWWHHV (1819). 
Wheatley  contributed  to  the  development  of  monetary  economics  by  refining  bullionist 
arguments and by taking them to extremes well before Ricardo did so in 7KH+LJK3ULFHRI
%XOOLRQ (1810). The bullionists (e.g. Francis Horner, Lord King, Henry Thornton) argued that 
the expansionary monetary policy of the Bank of England and the extensive note issue of 
country banks were responsible for the crises of 1793 and 1797. They urged the government 
to return to a gold currency. The antibullionists (e.g. William Colville, Jeremiah Harman) 
maintained the position that foreign expenditure due to the war, its adverse effects on trade 
and bad harvests caused the monetary problems and subscribed to the real bills doctrine.  
Although Wheatley shared most of Thornton’s economic insights (a related acknowledgement 
is to be found in  5HPDUNV RQ &XUUHQF\ DQG &RPPHUFH (1803), he cited him rarely; once 
affirmatively with respect to Thornton’s rejection of Smith’s real bills argument and twice 
critically  with  respect  to  Thornton’s  mechanism  of  international  price  adjustment  and  his 
assessment of the Bank of England’s control of the note issue of county banks. Apart from the 
usual references to David Hume, Adam Smith and Sir James Steuart, he cited the pamphlet 
literature of his time (e.g. Walter Boyd, Lord King, Lord Liverpool, Rose). In addition to 
Steuart who served as the epitome of the “old school” (mercantilism), he also criticised Lord 
King – a fellow bullionist – very harshly.  
Wheatley’s methodological approach was characterised by the liberal tradition of the Scottish 
enlightment.  He  deduced  his  theoretical  arguments  from  first  principles  (i.e.  individual 
rationality, market transparency, low but positive transaction costs and a tendency towards 
market equilibrium). He built on economic history, comparative political economy and an 
intensive  but  not  uncritical  use  of  data  sources  to  provide  empirical  support  for  his 
conclusions and policy recommendations. He frequently rested the empirical assessment of 
the path of inflation in England on George Shuckburgh Evelyn’s statistical work on English 
prices  since  1066  and  on  international  price  comparisons  deduced  from  the  letters  of  Le 
Maitre, Kotzebue and Arthur Young. 
After the crises of 1793 the gold reserves of the Bank of England fell steadily from about £ 7 
million to below £ 1 million (February 1797). The decline was accompanied by inflation and 
an  unfavourable  exchange  of  English  bills  at  the  most  important  financial  centre  of  the 
continent,  Hamburg.  The  price  of  gold  bullion  tended  to  be  quite  stable  as  the  Bank  of 
England  redeemed  its  notes  in  gold.  At  the  same  time  the  balance  of  trade  remained   4 
favourable  throughout  the  course  of  events.  The  decline  of  the  Bank’s  specie  led  to  the 
Restriction issued by the King on February 26, 1797. In the following years the value of the 
British Pound declined internally and externally and the price of gold bullion increased. Even 
before the Restriction the economic analysis of the monetary system was further complicated 
by  the  prohibition  of  the  melting  of  British  gold  coins  and  of  the  export  of  bullion. 
Consequently, the international adjustment mechanism of a convertible paper system could 
only work to the extent that these were evaded.  
The postulate of strict purchasing power parity was the cornerstone of Wheatley’s arguments. 
Based on Hume’s quantity theory of money he highlighted the neutrality of money in the case 
of a monetary expansion in the long run. An increase of the quantity of money raised goods 
prices and wages proportionally and left the real wage and, consequently, employment and 
real output unaffected. He took the argument to extremes in his early works. As these are also 
his  most  popular  publications,  he  is  often  portrayed  as  a  proponent  of  strict  monetary 
neutrality.
1 However, he also pointed at the negative distributional effects of inflation due to 
long-term contracts and the negative real effects of a sharp reduction of the quantity of money 
too. The interpretation of Wheatley’s concept of monetary neutrality needs to differentiate 
carefully between increases and decreases in the quantity of money and the relevant time 
horizon.  Especially  in  his  later  publications  he  repeatedly  stressed  his  concern  about 
distributional and secondary effects (bankruptcies). He emphasised that a short-term reduction 
of the quantity of money did have real effects due to a disruption of the payment system 
hampering  economic  conduct  as  well  as  the  ensuing  bankruptcies  and  that  a  monetary 
contraction was not neutral in the short run. From his /HWWHUWR/RUG*UHQYLOOHRQWKH'LVWUHVV
RIWKH&RXQWU\ (1816) it can be inferred that he was primarily concerned with the secondary 
effects (distribution, bankruptcies) of long-term contracts rather than the direct effects of the 
short-term inflexibility of prices and wages on allocation. He suggested indexation – based on 
Shuckburgh’s  statistics  –  as  a  possible  solution.  His  condemnation  of  sharp  monetary 
contractions grew over time due to the experience of the crisis of 1814-16. In 1816 Wheatley 
also started to get an inflationary bias. He regarded the aggregate short-term welfare effects of 
inflation  (increases  (!)  in  economic  activity  and  the  negative  distributional  effects)  to  be 
preferable to catastrophic consequences of deflation resulting mostly from reduced economic 
activity and bankruptcies. 
                                                             
1 See inter alia Humphrey (1994).    5 
Wheatley developed different international adjustment mechanisms for national inflation – 
which  was  solely  due  to  increases  in  the  quantity  of  money  –  for  a  gold  standard  (or 
convertible  bank  notes)  and  for  an  inconvertible  currency.  His  international  adjustment 
mechanism under a gold standard was more complex than Thornton’s (or Hume’s) which 
rested on trade in goods and services. According to Thornton, higher prices at home increased 
imports and decreased exports. The resulting excess supply of English bills in Hamburg led to 
an unfavourable exchange. He must have assumed that international trade patterns were more 
flexible than the exchange rate.  
Wheatley, on the contrary, argued that trade patterns remained unaffected by a variation of the 
relative value of money in England because prices on foreign exchange markets were more 
flexible  than  international  trade  patterns  and  adjusted  immediately.  The  adjustment  of 
exchange rates eliminated the international price difference on goods markets such that the 
relative  purchasing  power  of  money  remained  unaffected  for  merchants  in  international 
markets.  He  postulated  a  very  strict  form  of  purchasing  power  parity.  Any  discount  on 
English bills in Hamburg in excess of the transaction costs of exporting bullion provided an 
incentive for bullion merchants to buy English bills in Hamburg at the prevailing discount, 
redeem them for gold at par at the London banks and export the gold to Hamburg. As English 
bullion could not trade at a discount in Hamburg the profit was equal to the discount minus 
the transaction costs. The export of English bullion to Hamburg re-established purchasing 
power parity in national markets within the limits of transaction costs by deflating English 
prices but without effecting prices elsewhere.  
Wheatley,  however,  implicitly  assumed  that  the  aggregate  price  level  of  exported  goods 
perfectly corresponded to the aggregate price level of the entire economies involved, that the 
exchange  rate  adjusted  instantaneously  and  that  the  international  bullion  market  –  once 
transaction costs are taken into account – operated without frictions despite the restrictive 
legal  framework.  He  argued  that  the  prohibition  was  evaded  easily.  As  the  adjustment 
mechanism rested on disparities between the paths of the price levels of different countries, a 
concerted over-expansion of paper in all countries could not be prevented by the mechanism.  
The  international  adjustment  mechanism  under  an  inconvertible  paper  standard  was  even 
simpler. Gold merchants could profit from the export of specie as long as bank notes traded at 
par. If gold was more valuable abroad than the equivalent of the purchasing power of bank 
notes  at  home,  individuals  would  sell  gold  for  bank  notes  only  at  a  premium  under 
inconvertibility. The purchasing power of gold would be equal across the world. The discount   6 
of bank notes reduced the real quantity of bank notes proportionally to the increase in prices 
and the real quantity of money would remain unchanged. The real purchasing power of bank 
notes abroad was adjusted by the exchange rate in terms of paper while that in terms of gold 
remained unaffected. Again, Wheatley took into account transaction costs. If the international 
price differential in terms of gold did not exceed the transaction costs, gold and bank notes 
continued to exchange at par and the price differential vis-à-vis the rest of the world would 
not be eliminated. 
After the Restriction the directors of the Bank of England stoutly opposed foreign expenditure 
to England’s continental allies. They feared that it would further diminish the Bank’s already 
low reserves. According to Wheatley, it did not even lead to a temporary outflow of specie or 
bullion as the most efficient means of payment were bills. The foreign subsidy was a transfer 
of current national income and not of money even if the means of payment were money. But 
if the foreign expenditure did not change the quantity of money in England relative to its 
quantity abroad, it did not change the relative price levels and, consequently, it had neither an 
effect on the exchange rate nor on the reserves of the Bank of England. Merchants on the 
continent who imported goods from England bought the entire additional supply  of bills. 
Wheatley assumed that the increase of imports from England – due to the additional income 
provided by the foreign expenditure – and the reduction of English imports – due to a lower 
disposable income at home – summed up to the amount of foreign expenditure. Furthermore, 
the additional English exports had to compensate for the reduction of English consumption 
expenditure such that aggregate demand and prices remained unaffected. 
Similar arguments applied to the adjustment mechanisms with respect to other non-monetary 
disturbances like bad harvests and England’s military expenditure on the continent. Wheatley 
took an extreme bullionist view that inflation, the high price of bullion and the unfavourable 
exchange were solely caused by an excessive quantity of money. Consequently, they were 
unambiguous signals of an external drain and called for a monetary contraction so that his 
policy recommendations focused on the monetary regime.  
He proposed that only chartered banks should have the right to issue bank notes (i.e. the Bank 
of England); that no small denomination bank notes must be issued at all and that England 
should return to a gold currency (and convertible paper); that the Bank of England should be 
required to disclose the stock of its circulating notes.  
During the crisis of 1793 the Bank of England refused to provide liquidity support to country 
banks. In the following years the latter established business relationships with London banks   7 
that enabled them so secure the indirect support of the Bank of England. In 1797 the public 
assessment of the creditworthiness of the country banks again deteriorated. But due to their 
links with London banks the drain on their reserves was redirected to the Bank of England 
which led to the Restriction on February 26. Wheatley reached the conclusion that the issue of 
bank notes by country banks would have to be prohibited. In his 5HSRUWRQWKH5HSRUWVRIWKH
%DQN&RPPLWWHHV (1819) he reiterated that conclusion in a vivid and mock discussion of the 
bursting of the “bubble of paper” (p. 10) in 1803 and in 1814-16. There – and in his /HWWHUWR
/RUG *UHQYLOOH RQ WKH 'LVWUHVV RI WKH &RXQWU\ (1816) – he also argued that the monetary 
contraction and the ensuing deflation following the failure of country banks and the distress it 
caused,  was  his  major  motivation  to  prohibit  country  banks  to  issue  notes.  According  to 
Wheatley’s 5HSRUWRQWKH5HSRUWVRIWKH%DQN&RPPLWWHHV (1819), the advantage of the Bank 
of England over the country banks was its invulnerability and the confidence it evoked in the 
public. 
Small denomination bank notes substituted for gold coins which the banks partly held as 
reserves.  In  order  to  maximise  profits  banks  reduced  their  reserves  to  a  minimum.  They 
invested as much as possible in securities at the London exchanges where gold merchants 
bought  them.  They  exported  them  to  profit  from  gold  arbitrage  due  to  the  unfavourable 
exchange  rate.  The  shortage  of  small  change  further  increased  the  demand  for  small 
denomination bank notes. The over-issue of paper was self-feeding. A bank run constituted 
the only check but could lead to a liquidity crisis in the entire economy, as it did in 1793, 
1803  and  1814-16.  Furthermore,  Wheatley  stressed  that  the  circulation  of  country  banks’ 
notes was subject to large fluctuations according to exogenously changing assessments of 
their liquidity and solvency. Wheatley rejected Thornton’s proposition that the note issue of 
country banks was sufficiently controlled by their obligation to redeem in Bank of England 
notes because he regarded the profit maximising reserve ratio and, consequently, the quantity 
of bank notes to be excessively volatile. Initially small denomination Bank of England notes 
would have to substitute for country bank notes, but in due course no notes below £ 10 should 
be issued at all and England would return to a gold currency. 
In  /HWWHU WR /RUG *UHQYLOOH RQ WKH 'LVWUHVV RI WKH &RXQWU\ (1816) he proposed a monetary 
policy target and a corresponding rule. In order to stabilize nominal prices, the quantity of 
money should increase in the same proportion as the population and real output in the long 
run. As population does not enter the quantity equation directly, he might have had in mind 
that an increase in population decreases the velocity of money. In the case of a negative shock 
(i.e.  bank  runs  on  country  banks)  the  stabilisation  of  nominal  prices  called  for  an   8 
expansionary monetary policy in the short run. In the case of such an internal drain, the Bank 
of England should have increased its note issue in the short-run to prevent a liquidity crisis. 
As the exchange rate was favourable during the 1797 crisis, the drain could not have been the 
consequence of the over-issue of paper. However, the directors of the Bank aggravated the 
internal drain by a restrictive monetary policy.  
In his 5HSRUWRQWKH5HSRUWVRIWKH%DQN&RPPLWWHHV (1819) he defended the cost advantage 
of specie based currency vis-à-vis one based on country bank notes and on inconvertible Bank 
of England notes. The opportunity costs of circulating specie were below the opportunity 
costs  of  paper  (about  5%)  plus  the  costs  of  recurring  liquidity  crises.  He  focused  on  the 
relative costs of alternative institutional arrangements rather than of different materials.  
In his 5HPDUNVRQ&XUUHQF\DQG&RPPHUFH (1803) Wheatley also discussed trade policy and 
proposed to abolish any trade restrictions which he deemed inefficient. He argued that the 
Methuen Treaty, forced exports and imports in colonial trade had a negative effect on national 
income. He attacked the monopoly of the East India Company. The scarcity of their shipping 
capacity should have been augmented by private English companies rather than by foreign 
ships. Furthermore, he argued that the duties on transit trade discourage the export of services. 
Even though they are repaid upon re-exportation the system required too much capital and 
renders transit trade unprofitable to a large extent.  
&RQFOXVLRQ
Wheatley’s  contribution  to  the  evolution  of  monetary  doctrine  is  still  underrated.  But  by 
taking the bullionist arguments to extremes and arriving at clear and unambiguous policy 
implications  he  differed  markedly  from  some  of  his  fellow  bullionists  (notably  from 
Thornton). The clear structure of his contribution and his criticism of arguments of fellow 
bullionists  demonstrated  the  independence  and  originality  of  his  thought  and  helped  to 
advance the course of monetary doctrine. 
Based on his “An Essay on the Theory of Money and Principles of Commerce” (1807) most 
historians of economic thought portray him as a proponent of strict monetary neutrality. In 
this paper I show that his position becomes more differentiated during his experience of the 
crisis of 1814-16 by drawing attention to his less popular pamphlets of 1816 and 1819. There, 
he highlights the role of the payment system in the propagation of monetary shocks to the real 
economy. He emphasises the pronounced real effects a reduction of the quantity of money can 
have due to a disruption of the payment system.     9 
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